distinguishing capacity

1) емкость, объем

2) правоспособность

3) звание, должность, профессия

4) предельные параметры ( технические)

•

- capacity to sue

1) Advertising: specific distinction

2) Patents: distinguishing capacity

"part;

Teil"

* * *

1. adj particular

segretario private

in particolare in particular

2. m particular, detail

* * *

particolare agg.

1 ( speciale) special, particular, peculiar: un caso particolare, a particular case; cura particolare, particular care; un favore particolare, a special favour; missione particolare, special mission; segni particolari, ( sul passaporto) distinguishing features; ho delle ragioni particolari per desiderarlo, I have my own peculiar reasons for wishing it; non ho niente di particolare da dirti, I have nothing special to tell you; partii senza alcuna ragione particolare, I left for no particular reason; ha un'andatura particolare, that gait is peculiar to him // (dir.) legato particolare, specific legacy

2 ( privato) particular, private, personal: lettera particolare, personal letter; lezione particolare, private lesson

3 ( strano, bizzarro) peculiar, strange, odd: un carattere particolare, a peculiar character; idee particolari, odd ideas

4 ( accurato) detailed, particular: descrizione particolare, detailed description

◆ s.m.

1 detail, particular: i particolari di un progetto, the details of a plan; dare i particolari di qlco., to give particulars of sthg.; entrare nei particolari, to go into details; eseguire un ordine in ogni particolare, to carry out an order to the last detail; (dir.) particolari giudiziari, particulars // in particolare, particularly (o in particular); desidero questo in particolare, I want this particularly // (mecc.) particolare finito, lavorato, finished, machined part

2 ( individuo) individual: agire in qualità di particolare, to act in one's individual capacity (o merely as a private individual).

* * *

1. agg

1) (specifico) particular, (caratteristico) distinctive, (speciale) special, particular

2) (strano) peculiar, odd

3) (insolito) unusual

4) (privato: udienza, ragioni) private, personal

2. sm

* * *

1) particular, special

2) in particolare especially, in particular

3) in particolar modo (specialmente) particularly, in particular, especially, specially, chiefly, mainly, mostly

sostantivo maschile particular, detail

* * *

particolare

/partiko'lare/

I aggettivo

 1 particular, special; segni -i distinguishing marks, particulars; in questo caso particolare in this particular instance; senza un o per nessun motivo particolare for no particular reason; niente di particolare nothing special; prestare particolare attenzione to pay special attention; segretario particolare personal assistant, social secretary

 2 in particolare especially, in particular; perché lei in particolare? why her especially? stai cercando qualcosa in particolare? are you looking for anything in particular?

 3 in particolar modo (specialmente) particularly, in particular, especially, specially, chiefly, mainly, mostly

II sostantivo maschile

 particular, detail; in tutti i -i in every particular; descrivere qcs. fin nei minimi -i to describe sth. down to the smallest details o in minute detail; entrare nei -i to enter into details.

discrētĭo, ōnis, f. [discerno] (postclass.).

A separation:

cum vis aliqua utrumque (corpus et animam) discreverit, quae discretio mors vocetur,

Macr. Somn. Scip. 1, 6, 17; Lact. 7, 12, 4.—

A difference, distinction:

sine discretione,

Pall. Jul. 4, 5; Amm. 17, 1 al.—

Discernment, discrimination, capacity for distinguishing (late Lat.):

ne, propter discretionem difficilem, jus incertum sit,

Vulg. 1 Cor. 12, 10:

boni ac mali,

id. Hebr. 5, 14.

διάληψις, later [full] διάλημψις, in Doricized form [full] διάλᾱμψις (q.v.), εως, ἡ, ([etym.] διαλαμβάνω)

A grasping with both hands: ἐκ διαλήψεως, opp. ἐκ καταφορᾶς, as thrusting to cutting, Plb.2.33.6.

2

ἡ δ. τῆς χώρας

power of holding, capacity,

D.S.3.37

.

3 containing, storage, PPetr. 3p.141 (iii B. C.).

II separating or distinguishing in thought, Epicur.Ep.1p.13U., Phld.D.3.8;

κατὰ διάληψιν

separately,

Id.Ir. p.76

W., Rh.1.91 S.

III judgement, opinion, Epicur.Nat.28.7;

ἡ περὶ θεῶν δ. Plb.6.56.6

; αἱ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου δ. ib.12, cf. LXX 2 Ma. 3.32;

ἐγέννησε τὴν περὶ αὑτοῦ δ. ὡς.. D.S.18.54

: esp. in good sense,

τῆς προαιρέσεως ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τὴν δ. ἐχούσης Inscr.Prien.117.60

(i B.C.);

ἀρετὴ καὶ δ. BCH37.125

(Abdera, ii B. C.).

2 sentence, punishment,

ἐνέχεσθαι ἱεροσυλίᾳ καὶ πίπτειν ὑπὸ πικροτέραν δ. Annales du Service 19.40

, cf. 42 (Egypt, i B.C.).

IV division, Porph.Sent.36 (pl.); distinction of parts, Arist.IA 705a25: pl., points of division or ramification, Id.PA 647b2; of the divisions of the vertebrae, ib. 652a17.

2 interval, = διάλειμμα, v.l. in Aret.SD1.12.

V digression in a narrative, Iamb.Bab.17.

λόγος, ου, ὁ (verbal noun of λέγω in the sense ‘pick’; Hom.+).

① a communication whereby the mind finds expression, word

ⓐ of utterance, chiefly oral.

α. as expression, word (oratorical ability plus exceptional performance were distinguishing marks in Hellenic society, hence the frequent association of λ. and ἔργον ‘deed’; a sim. formulation as early as Il. 9, 443 μύθων τε ῥητῆρʼ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων; Polystrat. p. 33 μὴ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλʼ ἔργω; Just., A II, 4, 2 ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ and D. 35, 7 λόγον ἢ πρᾶξιν) δυνατὸς ἐν ἔργῳ κ. λόγῳ, i.e. an exceptional personage Lk 24:19; pl. of Moses Ac 7:22 (the contrast expressed w. a verb Choix 20, 6–8 ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν ὄτι δύναται καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ of Apollordorus, a benefactor in Cyzicus, a flourishing city in Phrygia; sim. New Docs 7, 233, no. 10, 8f πολιτευόμενος … λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ; cp. IKourion 32, 8; without contrast Diod S 13, 101, 3 ἄνδρας λόγῳ δυνατούς; for sim. constructions using λέγω and πράσσω s. Danker, Benefactor 339–43). Cp. Ro 15:18; 2 Cor 10:11; Col 3:17; 2 Th 2:17; Hb 13:21 v.l.; 1J 3:18 (cp. Theognis 1, 87f Diehl³ μή μʼ ἔπεσιν μὲν στέργε κτλ.—For the contrast λόγῳ … ἀληθείᾳ cp. Diod S 13, 4, 1). In contrast to a sinful deed we also have the λόγος ἁμαρτίας sinful word Judaicon 172, 9. W. γνῶσις: ἐν παντὶ λόγῳ κ. πάσῃ γνώσει 1 Cor 1:5. ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῇ γνώσει 2 Cor 11:6. (Opp. δύναμις ‘revelation of power’) 1 Cor 4:19, 20. τὸ εὐαγγέλιον οὐκ ἐγενήθη ἐν λόγῳ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει 1 Th 1:5 (cp. Ar. 13, 7 of mythical accounts οὐδέν εἰσιν εἰ μὴ μόνον λόγοι ‘they’re nothing but words’). W. ἐπιστολή: 2 Th 2:2, 15. W. ἀναστροφή: 1 Ti 4:12; 1 Pt 3:1b. Opp. ‘be silent’: IRo 2:1.—μόνον εἰπὲ λόγῳ just say the word Mt 8:8; cp. Lk 7:7 (Ath. 17, 1 ὡς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν; 29, 2; Phalaris, Ep. 121, 1 λόγῳ λέγειν; cp. schol. on Pla. 341a ἐν λόγῳ μόνον εἰπεῖν). οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο ἀποκριθῆναι αὐτῷ λόγον no one was able to answer him a (single) word Mt 22:46; cp. 15:23 (cp. TestAbr A 16 p. 98, 11 [Stone p. 44] οὐκ ἀπεκρίθη αὐτῷ λόγον).— The (mighty) word (of one who performs miracles) ἐξέβαλεν τὰ πνεύματα λόγῳ Mt 8:16 (a rare use of λ. as ‘single utterance’, s. L-S-J-M s.v. VII).—διὰ λόγου by word of mouth (opp. ‘by letter’) Ac 15:27.—In the textually uncertain pass. Ac 20:24 the text as it stands in N., οὐδενὸς λόγου (v.l. λόγον) ποιοῦμαι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμίαν, may well mean: I do not consider my life worth a single word (cp. λόγου ἄξιον [ἄξιος 1a] and our ‘worth mention’; s. Conzelmann ad loc.).

β. The expression may take on a variety of formulations or topical nuances: what you say Mt 5:37; statement (PGM 4, 334) Lk 20:20; question (Sext. Emp., Math. 8, 295; 9, 133; Diog. L. 2, 116) ἐρωτήσω ὑμᾶς λόγον I will ask you a question (cp. TestJob 36:5; GrBar 5:1; ApcSed 13:6; Jos., Ant. 12, 99) Mt 21:24; cp. Mk 11:29; Lk 20:3; prayer (PGM 1, 25; 4, 90; 179; 230 al.; 5, 180; 196 al.) Mt 26:44; Mk 14:39. ἡγούμενος τοῦ λ. principal speaker Ac 14:12. W. epexeget. gen. λ. παρακλήσεως 13:15. W. κήρυγμα our manner of presentation and our proclamation 1 Cor 2:4a (but s. comm.). (W. διδασκαλία) preaching 1 Ti 5:17; prophecy (Biogr. p. 364 [Pythia]) J 2:22; 18:32. Command (Aeschyl., Pers. 363) Lk 4:36; 2 Pt 3:5, 7; via a letter 2 Th 3:14. Report, story (X., An. 1, 4, 7; Diod S 3, 40, 9; 19, 110, 1 λ. διαδιδόναι=spread a report; Appian, Iber. 80 §346, Maced. 4 §1 [both=rumor]; Diod S 32, 15, 3 ἦλθεν ὁ λ. ἐπί τινα=the report came to someone; Arrian, Anab. 7, 22, 1 λόγος λέγεται τοιόσδε=a story is told like this, Ind. 9, 2; Diod S 3, 18, 3 λ.=story, account; Jos., Ant. 19, 132; Tat. 27, 2 τοῦ καθʼ Ἡρακλέα λόγου) Mt 28:15; Mk 1:45; Lk 5:15 (λ. περί τινος as X., An. 6, 6, 13; Jos., Ant. 19, 127) 7:17; J 21:23. ἠκούσθη ὁ λόγος εἰς τὰ ὦτα τ. ἐκκλησίας the report came to the ears of the assembly in Jerusalem Ac 11:22. λόγον ἔχειν σοφίας have the appearance of wisdom, pass for wisdom Col 2:23 (cp. Pla., Epinomis 987b ἔχει λόγον; Demosth., C. Lept. 462 [20, 18] λόγον τινʼ ἔχον; but mng. 2f is possible). Proverb (Pla., Phdr. 17, 240c, Symp. 18, 195b, Gorg. 54, 499c, Leg. 6, 5, 757a; Socrat., Ep. 22, 1) J 4:37 (Ps.-Callisth. 1, 13, 7 ἀληθῶς ἐν τούτῳ ὁ λ. foll. by a proverb). Proclamation, instruction, teaching, message Lk 4:32; 10:39; J 4:41; 17:20; Ac 2:41; 4:4; 10:44; 20:7; 1 Cor 1:17; 2:1. In Ac18:15 ζητήματα περὶ λόγου καὶ ὀνομάτων καὶ νόμου the sense appears to be someth. like this: controversial issues involving disputes about words and your way of life with λ. prob. referring to the presentation of controversial subjects, which in turn arouses heated ζητήματα debates. λόγος σοφίας proclamation of wisdom, speaking wisely 1 Cor 12:8a (Ps.-Phoc. 129 τῆς θεοπνεύστου σοφίης λ.); corresp. λ. γνώσεως vs. 8b. Cp. 14:9; 15:2; 2 Cor 1:18; 6:7; 10:10. λ. μαρτυρίας word of witness Rv 12:11. ὁ κατὰ τ. διδαχὴν πιστὸς λ. the message of faith, corresponding to the teaching Tit 1:9; the opp. 2 Ti 2:17. A speech (Aristot. p. 14b, 2; Diod S 40, 5a) διὰ λόγου πολλοῦ in a long speech Ac 15:32; cp. 20:2. λ. κολακείας flattering speech 1 Th 2:5. Speaking gener. 2 Cor 8:7; Eph 6:19; Col 4:6; D 2:5. ἐν λόγῳ πταίειν make a mistake in what one says Js 3:2.—Of God’s word, command, commission (LXX; ParJer 5:19 κατηχῆσαι αὐτοὺς τὸν λόγον; SyrBar 13:2; ApcSed 14:10; Just., D. 84, 2; Ael. Aristid. hears a ἱερὸς λ. at night fr. a god: 28, 116 K.=49, p. 529 D.; Sextus 24) ἠκυρώσατε τ. λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ Mt 15:6 (v.l. νόμον, ἐντολήν); cp. Mk 7:13.—J 5:38; 8:55; 10:35; Ro 3:4 (Ps 50:6). Of God’s promise Ro 9:6, 9 (but these two vss., and Gal 5:14 below, prob. fit better under 2a), 28 (Is 10:22f). Cp. Hb 2:2; 4:2 (s. ἀκοή 4b); 7:28; 12:19. For B 15:1 see 1aδ. The whole law (as the expr. εἴ τι ἑτέρα ἐντολή indicates not limited to a narrow list of commandments), acc. to Ro 13:9. In what is prob. a play on words (s. 2a and b), Gal 5:14 (s. 2a below) is summed up in the λόγος as expressed in Lev 19:18.—That which God has created ἁγιάζεται διὰ λόγου θεοῦ 1 Ti 4:5; in line w. the context, this hardly refers to God’s creative word (so SibOr 3, 20; PtK 2; πάντα γὰρ λόγῳ ποιήσας ὁ θεός Theoph. Ant. 2, 18 [144, 8]), but to table prayers which use biblical expressions. The divine word as judge of thoughts Hb 4:12. τελεσθήσονται οἱ λ. τοῦ θεοῦ Ac 17:17; cp. 19:9.—Of the divine revelation through Christ and his messengers (Just., A I, 61, 9 λόγον … παρὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἐμάθομεν τοῦτον) θεὸς ἐφανέρωσεν τὸν λ. αὐτοῦ ἐν κηρύγματι Tit 1:3. δέδωκα αὐτοῖς τὸν λ. σου J 17:14; cp. vss. 6, 17; 1J 1:10; 2:14. ἵνα μὴ ὁ λ. τοῦ θεοῦ βλασφημῆται Tit 2:5. The apostles and other preachers, w. ref. to the λόγος of God, are said to: λαλεῖν Ac 4:29, 31; 13:46; Phil 1:14; Hb 13:7; καταγγέλλειν Ac 13:5; 17:13; διδάσκειν 18:11; μαρτυρεῖν Rv 1:2. Of their hearers it is said: τὸν λ. τοῦ θεοῦ ἀκούειν Ac 13:7; δέχεσθαι 8:14; 11:1. Of the λ. τοῦ θεοῦ itself we read: ηὔξανεν Ac 6:7; 12:24; 19:20; οὐ δέδεται 2 Ti 2:9. In these places and many others ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ is simply the Christian message, the gospel: Lk 5:1; 8:11, 21; 11:28 (Simplicius in Epict. p. 1, 20 μὴ μόνον ἀκουόντων ἀλλὰ πασχόντων καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων=let the message have its effect on oneself); Ac 6:2 (s. καταλείπω 7c; for prob. commercial metaph. s. 2a below); 13:44 v.l. (for κυρίου); 16:32 v.l.; 1 Cor 14:36; 2 Cor 2:17; 4:2; Col 1:25; 1 Pt 1:23; Rv 1:9; 6:9; 20:4; IPhld 11:1. Cp. 1 Th 2:13ab; 1J 2:5.—Since this ‘divine word’ is brought to humanity through Christ, his word can be used in the same sense: ὁ λόγος μου J 5:24; cp. 8:31, 37, 43, 51f; 12:48; 14:23f; 15:3, 20b; Rv 3:8. ὁ λόγος τοῦ Χριστοῦ Col 3:16; cp. Hb 6:1. ὁ λ. τοῦ κυρίου Ac 8:25; 12:24 v.l.; 13:44, 48f; 14:25 v.l.; 15:35, 36; 16:32 (cp. λ. θεοῦ); 19:10; 1 Th 1:8; 2 Th 3:1. Pl. Mk 8:38 (Lk 9:26); 1 Ti 6:3; cp. Lk 24:44; s. also 1aδ.—Or it is called simply ὁ λόγος=the ‘Word’, for no misunderstanding would be possible among Christians: Mt 13:20–23; Mk 2:2; 4:14–20, 33; 8:32 (s. 1aε below); 16:20; Lk 1:2; 8:12f, 15; Ac 6:4; 8:4; 10:36 (on the syntax s. FNeirynck, ETL 60, ’84, 118–23); 11:19; 14:25 (cp. λ. κυρίου above); 16:6; 17:11; 18:5; Gal 6:6; Phil 1:14; Col 4:3; 1 Th 1:6; 2 Ti 4:2; Js 1:21ff; 1 Pt 2:8; 3:1; 1J 2:7; AcPl Ha 7, 6 (so also Mel., HE 4, 26, 13; Ath. 2, 3).—Somet. the ‘Word’ is more closely defined by a gen.: ὁ λ. τῆς βασιλείας the word of the reign/rule (of God) Mt 13:19. τῆς σωτηρίας Ac 13:26. τῆς καταλλαγῆς 2 Cor 5:19. τοῦ σταυροῦ 1 Cor 1:18. δικαιοσύνης (q.v. 3a) Hb 5:13. ζωῆς Phil 2:16. (τῆς) ἀληθείας (Theoph. Ant. 3, 4 [p. 212, 2]; cp. περὶ ἀληθείας Hippol., Ref. 10, 6, 1) Eph 1:13; Col 1:5; 2 Ti 2:15; Js 1:18; AcPl Ha 8, 8 (Just., D. 121, 2). τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ (=τοῦ κυρίου) Ac 14:3; 20:32. (Differently the pl. οἱ λόγοι τ. χάριτος gracious words Lk 4:22; cp. Marcellinus, Vi. Thu. 57 Hude λόγοι εἰρωνείας.) ὁ λ. τοῦ εὐαγγελίου Ac 15:7; ὁ τοῦ Χριστιανισμοῦ λ. MPol 10:1. In Rv 3:10 the gospel is described by the ‘One who has the key of David’ as ὁ λ. τῆς ὑπομονῆς μου my word of endurance (W-S. §30, 12c). λ. τῶν ὑ[πο]μονῶν AcPl Ha 6, 11. παρελάβετε τὸν λ. ὅτι AcPl Ha 8, 25.—The pastoral letters favor the expr. πιστὸς ὁ λόγος (sc. ἐστίν, and s. πιστός 1b) 1 Ti 1:15; 3:1; 4:9; 2 Ti 2:11; Tit 3:8; cp. Rv 21:5; 22:6. λ. ὑγιής sound preaching Tit 2:8; cp. the pl. ὑγιαίνοντες λόγοι 2 Ti 1:13 (on medicinal use of words for the mind or soul s. VLeinieks, The City of Dionysos ’96, 115–22, on Eur.).—The pl. is also used gener. of Christian teachings, the words of the gospel Lk 1:4 (s. κατηχέω 2a); 1 Th 4:18. οἱ λ. τῆς πίστεως 1 Ti 4:6. On λόγοι κυριακοί for λόγια κυριακά in the title of the Papias document s. ἐξήγησις 2.—JSchniewind, Die Begriffe Wort und Evangelium bei Pls, diss. Bonn 1910; RAsting (εὐαγγέλιον, end).

γ. of an individual declaration or remark: assertion, declaration, speech ἀκούσαντες τὸν λ. when they heard the statement Mt 15:12; cp. 19:11, 22; 22:15; Mk 5:36. διὰ τοῦτον τὸν λ. because of this statement of yours 7:29 (TestAbr A 15 p. 95, 29 [Stone p. 38] τὸν λ. τοῦτον; ApcMos 25 εἰς τὸν λόγον σου κρινῶ σε). Cp. 10:22; 12:13; Lk 1:29; 22:61 v.l. (for ῥήματος); J 4:39, 50; 6:60; 7:36, 40 v.l.; 15:20a; 18:9; 19:8; Ac 6:5; 7:29; 20:38; 22:22; 1 Th 4:15. ὸ̔ς ἐὰν εἴπῃ λόγον κατὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου whoever utters a (defamatory) word against the Son of Humanity Mt 12:32 (λ. εἰπεῖν κατά τινος as Jos., Ant. 15, 81); cp. Lk 12:10. λόγος σαπρός unwholesome talk Eph 4:29. λόγον ποιεῖσθαι make a speech Ac 11:2 D (cp. Hyperid. 3, 20; Jos., Ant. 11, 86).

δ. the pl. (οἱ) λόγοι is used, on the one hand, of words uttered on various occasions, of speeches or instruction given here and there by humans or transcendent beings (TestAbr A 14 p. 94, 19 [Stone p. 36]; Jos., Ant. 4, 264; Just., D. 100, 3) ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου δικαιωθήσῃ (καταδικασθήσῃ) Mt 12:37ab; 24:35; Mk 13:31; Lk 21:33; Ac 2:40; 7:22 (ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἔργοις αὐτοῦ. On the word-deed pair cp. Dio Chrys. 4, 6 the λόγοι and ἔργα of Diogenes; s. α above). οἱ δέκα λόγοι the ten commandments (Ex 34:28; Dt 10:4; Philo, Rer. Div. Her. 168, Decal. 32; Jos., Ant. 3, 138; cp. 91f; Did., Gen. 36, 10) B 15:1. Ac 15:24; 20:35; 1 Cor 2:4b, 13; 14:19ab; κενοὶ λ. Eph 5:6; AcPl Ox 6, 13 (cp. Aa 1, 241, 14); Dg 8:2; πλαστοὶ λ. 2 Pt 2:3. λ. πονηροί 3J 10.—Also of words and exprs. that form a unity, whether it be connected discourse (Jos., Ant. 15, 126; Just., A II, 12, 6, D. 11, 5; 81, 3 al.), a conversation, or parts of one and the same teaching, or expositions on the same subject (Diod S 16, 2, 3 μετέσχε τῶν Πυθαγορίων λόγων; Dio Chrys. 37 [54], 1; Ael. Aristid. 50, 55 K.=26 p. 519 D.: οἱ Πλάτωνος λόγοι; PsSol 17:43 [words of the Messiah]; AscIs 3:12 οἱ λόγοι τοῦ Βελχειρά) πᾶς ὅστις ἀκούει μου τοὺς λόγους τούτους Mt 7:24; cp. vss. 26, 28; 10:14; 19:1; 26:1; Mk 10:24; Lk 1:20; 6:47; 9:28, 44. ἐπηρώτα αὐτὸν ἐν λόγοις ἱκανοῖς he questioned him at some length 23:9. τίνες οἱ λ. οὗτοι οὓς ἀντιβάλλετε; what is this conversation that you are holding? 24:17; J 7:40 (s. γ); 10:19; J 14:24a; 19:13; Ac 2:22; 5:5, 24; 16:36; 2 Ti 4:15; 1 Cl 13:1; 46:7. λόγοις φθοριμαίοις AcPlCor 1:2.

ε. the subject under discussion, matter, thing gener. (Theognis 1055 Diehl; Hdt. 8, 65 μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον εἴπῃς. Cp. Hebr. דָּבָר) τὸν λ. ἐκράτησαν they took up the subject Mk 9:10; cp. Mt. 21:24 (s. 1aβ beg.). οὐκ ἔστιν σοι μερὶς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ you have no share in this matter Ac 8:21. ἰδεῖν περὶ τ. λόγου τούτου look into this matter 15:6. ἔχειν πρός τινα λόγον have a complaint against someone (cp. Demosth. 35, 55 ἐμοὶ πρὸς τούτους ὁ λόγος; PIand 16, 3 δίκαιον λόγον ἔχει πρὸς σέ) 19:38. παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας Mt 5:32; 19:9 v.l. (2d is also prob.).—Perh. also Mk 8:32 he discussed the subject quite freely (but s. 1aβ above).

ⓑ of literary or oratorical productions: of the separate books of a work (Hdt. 5, 36 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τ. λόγων; Pla., Parmen. 2, 127d ὁ πρῶτος λόγος; Philo, Omn. Prob. Lib. 1 ὁ μὲν πρότερος λόγος ἦν ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεόδοτε, περὶ τοῦ …) treatise Ac 1:1 (s. on the prologue to Ac: AHilgenfeld, ZWT 41, 1898, 619ff; AGercke, Her 29, 1894, 373ff; RLaqueur, Her 46, 1911, 161ff; Norden, Agn. Th. 311ff; JCreed, JTS 35, ’34, 176–82; Goodsp., Probs. 119–21). Παπίας … πέντε λόγους κυριακῶν λογίων ἔγραψεν Papias (11:1; cp. 3:1 e; 11:2; 12:2).—περὶ οὗ πολὺς ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος about this we have much to say Hb 5:11. Hb is described as ὁ λ. τῆς παρακλήσεως a word of exhortation (in literary form) 13:22. Of writings that are part of Holy Scripture ὁ λ. Ἠσαί̈ου J 12:38. ὁ λ. ὁ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γεγραμμένος 15:25; ὁ προφητικὸς λ. 2 Pt 1:19; 2 Cl 11:2 (quot. of unknown orig.); AcPl Ha 8, 27/BMM recto 35 (Just., D. 77, 2 al.). ὁ ἅγιος λ. the holy word 1 Cl 56:3. ὁ λ. ὁ γεγραμμένος 1 Cor 15:54 (Is 25:8 and Hos 13:14 follow). Pl. οἱ λόγοι τ. προφητῶν Ac 15:15. ὡς γέγραπται ἐν βίβλῳ λόγων Ἠσαί̈ου Lk 3:4 (Pla., 7th Epistle 335a πείθεσθαι ἀεὶ χρὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις; TestJob 1:1 βίβλος λόγων Ἰώβ; ParJer 9:32 v.l. τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν λόγων Ἱερεμίου; ApcEsdr 1:1 καὶ ἀποκάλυψις τοῦ … Ἐσδράμ; ApcSed prol.; Just., D. 72, 3f).—Of the content of Rv: ὁ ἀναγινώσκων τ. λόγους τῆς προφητείας 1:3. οἱ λόγοι (τ. προφητείας) τ. βιβλίου τούτου 22:7, 9f, 18f.

② computation, reckoning

ⓐ a formal accounting, esp. of one’s actions, and freq. with fig. extension of commercial terminology account, accounts, reckoning λόγον δοῦναι (Hdt. 8, 100; X., Cyr. 1, 4, 3; Diod S 3, 46, 4; SIG 1099, 16; BGU 164, 21; Jos., Ant. 16, 120; Just., D. 115, 6) give account, make an accounting ἕκαστος περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λόγον δώσει τ. θεῷ Ro 14:12. Also λ. ἀποδοῦναι abs. (Just., D. 116, 1 al.; Diod S 16, 56, 4; 19, 9, 4) Hb 13:17. τινί to someone (Diod S 16, 27, 4; Plut., Alcib. 7, 3; Chariton 7, 6, 2; SIG 631, 13 τᾷ πόλει; 2 Ch 34:28; Da 6:3 Theod.; Jos., Bell. 1, 209) τῷ ἑτοίμως ἔχοντι κρῖναι 1 Pt 4:5. τινὸς of someth. (SIG 1044, 46; 1105, 10 τοῦ ἀναλώματος; Jos., Ant. 19, 307) Lk 16:2 (here λ. w. the art.; on the subject of undergoing an audit cp. Aeschin. 3, 22). Likew. περί τινος (Diod S 18, 60, 2 δοὺς αὑτῷ περὶ τούτων λόγον=taking account [considering] with himself; BGU 98, 25 περὶ τούτου) Mt 12:36; Ac 19:40. ὑπέρ τινος concerning someone Hv 3, 9, 10.—αἰτεῖν τινα λόγον περί τινος call someone to account for someth. 1 Pt 3:15 (cp. Pla., Pol. 285e; Dio Chrys. 20 [37], 30; Apc4Esdr Fgm. b ἕκαστος ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔργου τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτηθήσεται; Just., A I, 17, 4. For another perspective s. d below.).—Of banking responsibility ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ (PStras 72, 10 [III A.D.] ὁ τῶν θεῶν λ.; PHerm 108 [III A.D.] λ. τοῦ Σαραπείου) in wordplay Ac 6:2 (w. τράπεζα q.v. 1c); s. also 1aβ.—Of a ledger heading (POxy 1333 [II/III A.D.] δὸς αὐτῳ λόγῳ θεωρικῶν=credit him under ‘festivals’; for others s. Preisig., Wörterbuch s.v. λ. 14; s. also Fachwörter 119) Ro 9:6 (the point is that God’s ‘list’ of Israelites is accurate; on ἐκπίπτω in the sense ‘is not deficient’ s. s.v. 4); vs. 9 (the ‘count’ is subsumed by metonymy in divine promise); Gal 5:14 (all moral obligations come under one ‘entry’: ‘you shall love your neighbor as yourself’; for commercial association of ἀναλίσκω vs. 15, which rounds out the wordplay, s. s.v.). The contexts of these three passages suggest strong probability for commercial associations; for another view s. 1aβ.

ⓑ settlement (of an account) (εἰς λόγον commercial t.t. ‘in settlement of an account’ POxy 275, 19; 21) εἰς λόγον δόσεως κ. λήμψεως in settlement of a mutual account (lit., ‘of giving and receiving’, ‘of debit and credit’) Phil 4:15 (cp. Plut., Mor. 11b λόγον δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν; a parallel formulation POxy 1134,10 [421 A.D.] λ. λήμματος καὶ ἐξοδιασμοῦ=ledger of income and expenditures); for the linked accounting terms δόσις and λήμψις s. PCairMasp 151, 208 [VI A.D.]. The same ideas are in the background of εἰς λόγον ὑμῶν credited to your account vs 17.—συναίρειν λόγον settle accounts (BGU 775, 18f. The mid. in the same mng. PFay109, 6 [I A.D.]; POxy 113, 27f.—Dssm., LO 94 [LAE 118f]) μετά τινος Mt 18:23; 25:19.

ⓒ reflection, respect, regard εἰς λόγον τινός with regard to, for the sake of (Thu. 3, 46, 4; Demosth. 19, 142 εἰς ἀρετῆς λόγον; Polyb. 11, 28, 8; Ath. 31, 1; Ael. Aristid. 39 p. 743 D.: εἰς δεινότητος λ.) εἰς λ. τιμῆς IPhld 11:2. εἰς λ. θεοῦ ISm 10:1.

ⓓ reason for or cause of someth., reason, ground, motive (Just., D. 94, 3 δότε μοι λόγον, ὅτου χάριν … ; Ath. 30, 3 τὶς γὰρ … λόγος; Dio Chrys. 64 [14], 18 ἐκ τούτου τ. λόγου; Appian, Hann. 29 §126 τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ; Iambl., Vi. Pyth. 28, 155) τίνι λόγω; for what reason? Ac 10:29 (cp. Pla., Gorg. 512c τίνι δικαίῳ λ.; Appian, Mithrid. 57 §232 τίνι λόγῳ;). λόγον περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλπίδος 1 Pt 3:15 (but s. a above); κατὰ λόγον Ac 18:14 (s. κατά B 5bβ). παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας Mt 5:32; 19:9 v.l. (though 1aε is also poss.).

ⓔ πρὸς ὸ̔ν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος (ἐστίν) with whom we have to do (i.e. to reckon) (Dio Chrys. 31, 123; other exx. in FBleek, Hb II/1, 1836, 590ff), in his capacity as judge (Libanius, Legat. Ulixis [=Declamatio IV] 2 F. τοῖς δὲ ἀδίκως ἀποκτενοῦσι καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὁ λόγος γίγνεται) Hb 4:13. οὐ πρὸς σάρκα ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεόν he has to do not with flesh, but with God IMg 3:2.

ⓕ In Col 2:23 (s. 1aβ) λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα σοφίας may= make a case for wisdom (cp. λόγος ἡμῖν οὐδείς Plut., Mor. 870b).

③ the independent personified expression of God, the Logos. Our lit. shows traces of a way of thinking that was widespread in contemporary syncretism, as well as in Jewish wisdom lit. and Philo, the most prominent feature of which is the concept of the Logos, the independent, personified ‘Word’ (of God): GJs 11:2 (word of the angel to Mary) συνλήμψῃ ἐκ Λόγου αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ πάντων Δεσπότου). J 1:1abc, 14 (cp. Just., A I, 23, 2; Mel., P. 9, 61 and oft. by all apolog., exc.. Ar.). It is the distinctive teaching of the Fourth Gospel that this divine ‘Word’ took on human form in a historical person, that is, in Jesus (s. RSeeberg, Festgabe für AvHarnack ’21, 263–81.—Λόγος w. ζωή in gnostic speculation: Iren.1, 1, 1 [Harv. 1, 10, 4]; Aelian, VH 4, 20 ἐκάλουν τὸν Πρωταγόραν Λόγον. Similarly Favorinus [II A.D.]: Vorsokr. 80 A 1 ln. 22 [in Diog. L. 9, 50] of Democritus: ἐκαλεῖτο Σοφία. Equating a divinity with an abstraction that she personifies: Artem. 5, 18 φρόνησις εἶναι νομίζεται ἡ θεός [Athena]). Cp. 1J 1:1; Rv 19:13. εἷς θεός ἐστιν, ὁ φανερώσας ἑαυτὸν διὰ Ἰ. Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος, ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών there is one God, who has revealed himself through Jesus Christ his Son, who is his ‘Word’ proceeding from silence (i.e., without an oral pronouncement: in a transcendent manner) IMg 8:2 (s. σιγή). The Lord as νόμος κ. λόγος PtK 1. Cp. Dg 11:2, 3, 7, 8; 12:9.—HClavier, TManson memorial vol., ’59, 81–93: the Alexandrian eternal λόγος is also implied in Hb 4:12; 13:7.—S. also the ‘Comma Johanneum’ (to the bibliography in RGG³ I, ’54 [HGreeven] add AJülicher, GGA 1905, 930–35; AvHarnack, SBBerlAk 1915, 572f [=Studien I ’31, 151f]; MMeinertz, Einl. in d. NT⁴ ’33, 309–11; AGreiff, TQ 114, ’33, 465–80; CDodd, The Joh. Epistles ’46; WThiele, ZNW 50, ’59, 61–73) ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα 1J 5:7 v.l. (s. N. app.; Borger, TRu 52, ’87, 57f). (Such interpolations were not unheard of. According to Diog. L. 1, 48 some people maintain that Solon inserted the verse mentioning the Athenians after Il. 2, 557.—τῆς τριάδος, τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ Theoph. Ant. 2, 15 [p. 138, 19].)—On the Logos: EZeller, D. Philosophie der Griechen III 2⁴ 1903, 417–34; MHeinze, D. Lehre v. Logos in d. griech. Philosophie 1872; PWendland, Philo u. d. kynisch-stoische Diatribe (Beiträge z. Gesch. der griech. Philosophie u. Religion by Wendl. and OKern 1895, 1–75); AAall, Gesch. d. Logosidee 1896, 1899; MPohlenz, D. Stoa ’48f, I 482; 490 (index); LDürr, D. Wertung des göttl. Wortes im AT u. im ant. Orient ’38 (§9 of the Joh. Logos); EBréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie 1907, 83–111; (² ’25); JLebreton, Les théories du Logos au début de l’ère chrétienne 1907; ESchwartz, NGG 1908, 537–56; GVos, The Range of the Logos-Title in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel: PTR 11, 1913, 365–419; 557–602; RHarris, The Origin of the Prologue to St. John’s Gospel 1917, Athena, Sophia and the Logos: BJRL 7, 1, 1922 p. 56–72; M-JLagrange, Vers le Logos de S. Jean: RB 32, 1923, 161–84, Le Logos de Philon: ibid. 321–71; HLeisegang, Logos: Pauly-W. XIII 1926, 1035–81; TGlasson, Heraclitus’ Alleged Logos Doctr., JTS 3, ’52, 231–38.—NWeinstein, Z. Genesis d. Agada 1901, 29–90; Billerb. II 302–33.—Rtzst., Zwei religionsgeschichtl. Fragen 1901, 47–132, Mysterienrel.³ 1927, 428 index; WBousset, Kyrios Christos² 1921, 304ff; 316f; JKroll, D. Lehren d. Hermes Trismegistos1914, 418 index.—RBultmann, D. religionsgesch. Hintergrund des Prol. z. Joh.: HGunkel Festschr., 1923, II 1–26, Comm. ’41, 5ff; AAlexander, The Johannine Doctrine of the Logos: ET 36, 1925, 394–99; 467–72; (Rtzst. and) HSchaeder, Studien z. antiken Synkretismus 1926, 306–37; 350; GAvdBerghvanEysinga, In den beginne was de Logos: NThT 23, ’34, 105–23; JDillersberger, Das Wort von Logos ’35; RBury, The 4th Gosp. and the Logos-Doctrine ’40; EMay, CBQ 8, ’46, 438–47; GKnight, From Moses to Paul ’49, 120–29. TW IV 76–89; 126–40 (on this s. SLyonnet, Biblica 26, ’45, 126–31); CStange, ZST 21, ’50, 120–41; MBoismard, Le Prologue de St. Jean ’53; HLangkammer, BZ 9, ’65, 91–94; HRinggren, Word and Wisdom [hypostatization in Near East] ’47; WEltester, Haenchen Festschr., ’64, 109–34; HWeiss, Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie etc., TU 97, ’66, 216–82; MRissi, Die Logoslieder im Prolog des vierten Evangeliums, TZ 31, ’75, 321–36; HLausberg, NAWG, Ph. ’87, 1 pp. 1–7.—B. 1262. DELG s.v. λέγω B 1. M-M. EDNT. TW.

   1) Programs and the Complexity of Human Mental Processes

   In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Is an Engineering Discipline

   Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)

   3) A Sceptical View of Artificial Intelligence

   Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....

   When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)

   4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually

   Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the Program

   Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)

   6) The Meaning of a Symbolic Description

   What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   7) The Principle of Artificial Intelligence

   [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Artificial Intelligence Recognizes the Need for Knowledge in Its Systems

   The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)

   9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

    10) There Are Many Types of Reasoning

   There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:

    Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."

    Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)

    11) Programs Are Beginning to Do Things That Critics Have Asserted to Be Impossible

   Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)

    12) The Synthesis of Man and Machine

   Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)

    13) The Thesis of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)

   The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)

    14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation

   It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)

    15) Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence

   We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.

   ♦ Nonpsychological AI

   Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.

   ♦ Weak Psychological AI

   Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.

   ♦ Strong Psychological AI

... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)

   ♦ Suprapsychological AI

   Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)

    16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts

   Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)

    17) Form and Content Are Not Fundamentally Different

   Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System

   Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence

   The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.

   The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)

    20) Mathematical Logic Provides the Basis for Theory in AI

   The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....

   AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)

    21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions

   In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)

    22) Definitions of Artificial Intelligence

   Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)

    23) The Computer Can Not Be a Model of the Mind

   Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)

    24) Computers Will Not Always Be Inferior to Human Brains

   The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)